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This paper examines possible effects of EU membership and the shift to the euro 
on the monetary and exchange rate policies of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. 
The Baltics, which have extensive economic integration with euro-area states, 
all apply monetary policies based on fixed exchange rates. Estonia’s kroon is 
pegged directly to the euro. The external value of the Latvian lats is determined 
by a currency basket with a heavy euro weighting. Lithuania is currently shifting 
its peg of the litas from the US-dollar to a euro-dominated basket. The switch to 
the euro as the Baltics’ anchor currency has compelling practical reasons. Euro­
area countries now provide a significant share of foreign direct investment into 
the Baltics and they collectively comprise the Baltics’ largest trading partner. 
The Baltic financial sectors are also extensively integrated with the euro area. 
Finally, the Baltic economies are natural candidates for fixed exchange rates due 
to their small size and openness. Nevertheless, fixed exchange rate regimes 
always involve risks. Two of the biggest challenges facing the Baltic states are
(1) finding ways to keep productivity growth in line with real wage growth, and
(2) increasing the flexibility of labor markets.
JEL classification numbers E5, P2
* I would like to thank Ville Kaitila, Péter Mihâlyi, Jan Zielonka, and two anonymous referees 





























































































While membership in the European Union can affect an applicant country in 
many ways, this study confines itself to possible effects of EU membership on 
monetary and exchange rate policies in the case of the Baltic states. In their 
preparations for full participation in the euro area, we also examine what Stage 
Three of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) might mean for the conduct 
of monetary policy and exchange rate policies in the Baltics. While there most 
certainly is a political dimension to all this, I confine the analysis to economics.1
The start of Stage Three of EMU at the beginning of 1999 changed the 
global environment for monetary and exchange rate policies. Obviously, those 
countries with the most extensive trade and investment ties with the euro area 
feel this change the strongest. Among the most affected are the transition 
economies of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs), including the Baltics. The 
Estonian kroon, once pegged to the D-Mark, is now pegged to the euro. The 
Latvian lats is now valued according to a currency basket with a heavy euro 
weighting. Lithuania is currently in the process of abandoning its currency board 
arrangement, and will evidently peg the litas directly to the euro or to a currency 
basket in which the euro figures significantly.
The choice of an appropriate exchange rate arrangement in pre-accession 
countries poses a range of hard choices. Some of the larger transition economies 
in Eastern Europe have opted for relatively free-floating exchange rates. In 
Poland’s case, for example, such an arrangement is feasible due to the size of the 
Polish economy and the liquidity of Poland’s foreign exchange market.
The exchange rate arrangements chosen by the Baltic states essentially 
determine the type of monetary policy their central banks can pursue. Presently, 
all Baltic countries use fixed exchange rate regimes. Estonia and Lithuania 
continue to use a currency board, an arrangement whereby the country’s foreign 
currency reserves are maintained at a level sufficient to cover the monetary base 
at all times. Lithuania is abandoning its currency board, but it has announced 
that the external value of litas will remain fixed.
Because the Baltic economies are small and open to foreign trade, they are 
excellent candidates for a fixed exchange rate regime. Since the euro-area bloc 
constitutes the largest single trading partner for the Baltics, the euro is also the 
natural anchor currency for the Baltic countries. Moreover, because of the 
thinness of Baltic capital and foreign exchange markets, free-floating regimes
1 One could, for example, argue that the Baltic countries should fix their currencies to the euro 
as soon as possible to demonstrate their political will to integrate into the European Union. 




























































































could expose these countries to large swings in the external value of their 
currencies.
Whatever regime is used, the Baltics still need to keep a close watch on 
the development of the real value of their currencies. Most economists agree that 
the Baltic currencies were considerably undervalued when they were introduced. 
However, real effective exchange rates have appreciated so much in recent years 
that overvaluation is the issue today. In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, brisk 
growth in labor productivity has apparently staved off severe overvaluation, 
even in the face of large external imbalances. In Lithuania, however, labor 
productivity growth has clearly failed to keep pace with real wages.
Under the EU’s principle of acquis communautaire, Baltic economic 
policies will officially become a common EU concern when the Baltics are 
granted EU membership. In the case of exchange rate and monetary policies, the 
principle probably needs to be invoked even before the Baltics join the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism 2 (ERM2). Countries should probably join the 
ERM2 only when they are ready to join the monetary union. This would happen 
at the point when the needed real appreciation of the currencies (because of 
positive developments in productivity) has to a large extent already taken place. 
If a country is a member of the ERM2, and its productivity growth is much 
larger than that in the Euro area, then its inflation must also be clearly higher 
than in the Euro area, because the real appreciation of the currency cannot 
happen through changes in the nominal exchange rate. This in turn could 
threaten the Maastricht criterion on inflation.
The paper is structured as follows. Chapter two reviews the historical 
developments of the exchange rate and monetary policy in the three Baltic 
countries since regaining independence. We also look briefly at the development 
of Baltic banking systems, as they are very important to the conduct of monetary 
policy. Chapter three explores the possible and probable consequences of the 
introduction of the euro in the Baltic countries. In addition to monetary and 
exchange rate policies, we consider integration of the Baltic countries with the 
euro area in terms of foreign trade, capital flows, and financial systems. Chapter 
four examines exchange rate and monetary policy options in the period leading 




























































































Starting with Lithuania, the three Baltic countries declared their independence 
from the Soviet Union in the latter half of 1991. The process of economic 
reform started in the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s included the three 
Baltic republics. The first commercial bank in the Soviet Union was in fact 
established in Estonia in 1989 (Korhonen, 1996b).
This chapter discusses economic development in the Baltic countries 
during this decade. The section on currency reforms and exchange rate 
arrangements draws heavily on Lainela & Sutela (1994), as well as Korhonen 
(1996a), Korhonen & Pautola (1997) and Pautola (1998). The main reference for 
the section on banking sectors is Korhonen (1996b).
2.1 Currency Reforms and Exchange Rate Arrangements
Currency reform was an important component in the economic reforms of the 
Baltic countries. When prices in Russia were freed at the start of 1992, monthly 
inflation quickly jumped to over 30% as prices rose to eliminate the monetary 
overhang.2 After this first initial change in the price level, monthly inflation ran 
at approximately 10% during the first half of 1992. In June 1992, monthly 
inflation jumped to almost 30% and stayed there for nearly five months. 
Naturally, the external value of the ruble depreciated strongly during this period. 
In the Baltic countries, which were still part of the ruble area during the first half 
of 1992, the instability of the ruble prompted monetary authorities to seek 
alternative monetary arrangements. The three newly independent countries also 
wanted to assert their independence from the old regime in the monetary sphere.
2.1.1 Estonia
Estonia was the first Baltic country to introduce its own currency. Eventually, 
the Estonian authorities decided to adopt perhaps the most rigid and credible 
form of currency peg, a currency board system, whereby a central bank’s 
outstanding liabilities would always be backed 100% by its foreign currency 
reserves. Under the strictest possible currency board, variations in currency 
reserves would translate immediately into changes in the monetary base. In 
practice, countries that adopt currency boards usual retain some discretion over 
the monetary base. Nevertheless, the common feature of such arrangements is
2. A Brief History of Baltic Monetary and Exchange Rate Arrangements
2 Monetary overhang is the result of forced saving during the Soviet era. Households and 
companies could not increase their consumption at the same rate as their money holdings 
increased. Prices were fixed, so excess demand could not be eliminated by raising prices, i.e. 
open inflation. On monetary overhang in Russia, see e.g. Rautava (1993). For a more detailed 




























































































that the monetary base must be backed at least 100% by foreign currency 
reserves. A currency board also presupposes free movement of capital and 
precludes central bank lending to the public sector, so in effect adopting a 
currency board means giving up independence in monetary policy altogether. 
Money supply is wholly endogenous and dependent on capital flows. In return 
for this loss of independence, the currency board offers a quick way to gain 
confidence in a currency. This consideration apparently weighed heavily in the 
case of Estonia, which successfully launched a new currency in the midst of a 
complex political situation. Estonia’s monetary regime, generally regarded as 
highly credible, has benefited specifically from the fact that its currency board 
arrangement is so rigid and immutable. In addition, other components of 
Estonia’s economic policy have supported the currency board arrangement. For 
example, the Estonian government is prevented under the constitution from 
running substantial budget deficits. This consistent adherence to chosen policies 
during the transition process has conferred credibility on Estonia’s monetary 
arrangements and its economic policies in general.
In May 1992, the Estonian parliament passed three laws regarding 
monetary and exchange rate policy: a currency law, a law on the backing of the 
Estonian kroon, and a foreign exchange law (Eesti Pank 1992). Estonia balked at 
the strictest possible version of a currency board as the Bank of Estonia retained 
some discretion as to the amount of capital inflows allowed to boost the 
monetary base. In addition, the Bank of Estonia retained its right to set 
minimum reserve requirements for commercial banks, which again is not in 
accordance with orthodox definitions of a currency board system.3 Even so the 
Bank of Estonia has never wavered from the guiding rule that the country’s 
foreign currency reserves must at all times cover the currency in circulation and 
the deposits of commercial banks at the central bank. In practice, reserve 
coverage has averaged around 110%. The Estonian kroon was pegged to the D- 
Mark at a rate of eight to one (i.e. DEM 1 = EEK 8). The currency reform was 
implemented in June 1992 with the kroon totally convertible for current account 
purposes from the start of monetary reform. While the Bank of Estonia required 
exporters to surrender their export earnings within two months, it remains 
unclear how strictly this was rule was applied in the early years. Foreign 
currency deposits were allowed, but no new accounts were allowed to be 
opened. This regulation was repealed in March 1994. Since then the kroon has 
been fully convertible and the movement of capital virtually free.4 The exchange 
rate arrangement was quite successful in initially bringing inflation down, 
especially when compared to other countries of the former Soviet Union, 
including the other two Baltic countries. Chart 1.1 shows the monthly inflation
3 See, e.g. Hanke et a! (1993).




























































































rates for the three Baltic countries from June 1992 to December 1994. Note that 
Latvia and Estonia succeeded in bringing inflation down quickly, while 
Lithuania struggled considerably longer with high and variable inflation. 
Eventually, monthly inflation subsided in all cases. Annual inflation is currently 
in low single digits throughout the Baltics.




The first years of Estonia’s economic transition saw declining economic 
activity, much as in other transition countries. In countries of the former Soviet 
Union, the output collapse was larger than in most CEECs. The severity of the 
initial drop may be largely explained by the fact that the trade ties between the 
republics of the Soviet Union were closer than those between independent 
nations in the CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance).3 Economic 
activity in Estonia bottomed in 1994-1995, and eventually revived to a rapid 
pace. When growth reached 10.6% in 1997, concerns about overheating of the 
economy were expressed. Estonia’s vibrant economic growth has been 
associated with a deteriorating external balance. In 1997, the current account 
deficit reached 12% of GDP. The steadily worsening external balance and rapid 
growth in domestic credit (bank lending to the private sector increased 77% 
from December 1996 to December 1997) further contributed to doubts about the 
sustainability of Estonia’s exchange rate regime. In October 1997, the kroon 
came under speculative pressure. Nevertheless, the currency board arrangement 5
5 Much has been written on the reasons for economic downturn at the beginning of transition. 
While some authors blame overtly strict monetary and fiscal policies for declines in output, it 
is perhaps more realistic to treat transition as a structural shock that severs old trading patterns 
and reveals the inefficiency of many existing enterprises. In such situations, conventional 





























































































proved resilient. Interbank interest rates went up sharply (see Chart 1.2 for the 
one month Tallinn interbank offered rate), but soon capital flows reversed and 
interest rates started to fall. During the summer of 1998, the Russian crisis 
sparked some speculation about the monetary arrangement of Estonia, as 
Estonia was expected to suffer substantially from the drop of exports to Russia. 
So far Estonia seems to have weathered the crisis reasonably well, and the 
credibility of the kroon remains strong.
2.1.2 Latvia
Latvia chose to ease itself out of the ruble area by first introducing a temporary 
currency, the Latvian ruble, in May 1992. Like Estonia, Latvians already had 
plans for an independent currency 1990. From the start of the currency reform, 
the use of other currencies was allowed. The Latvian currency was also freely 
convertible for current and capital account transactions, although even today 
there are still restrictions on foreigners buying real estate.
Chart 1.2 One-month Talibor
d d d T d o d ’-. o  o  o
The Latvian authorities initially announced that a new permanent currency 
would be issued as soon as inflation had been brought under control. The 
introduction of the new currency, the lats, was supposed to take place in 1992, 
but was eventually postponed to March 1993. The switch to the lats was also 
gradual. In July 1993, all Latvian ruble bank deposits were converted into lats 




























































































Initially the Latvian ruble and the lats were floating currencies. There has 
been some debate as to how freely the currencies floated, but nevertheless the 
Latvian ruble and the lats appreciated strongly against the US dollar from 
summer 1992 to spring 1994. In March 1994, the lats was pegged to the notional 
currency of the International Monetary Fund, the Special Drawing Right, at a 
rate of just under eight to one (SDR 1 = LVL 0.7997).6 Latvia maintains this peg 
rigorously. Although Latvia does not have a currency board system, the Bank of 
Latvia’s policy is to keep its currency reserves backing the monetary base at 
over 100%. The Bank of Latvia has also introduced a number of monetary 
policy instruments (see Section 4.2.2).
Latvia’s initial contraction of output was larger than Estonia’s. When the 
economy started to recover in 1994-1995, the country was hit by a large banking 
crisis. The resulting monetary contraction curtailed growth during 1995. 
Thereafter, growth accelerated to 8.6% in 1997. Yearly inflation, meanwhile, 
declined steadily to a level below 2%.
2.1.3 Lithuania
Like Latvia, Lithuania took a gradualist approach to monetary reform. Although 
the Lithuanian parliament accepted a law on national currency in December 
1991, political debates about the new currency prevented Lithuania from leaving 
the ruble zone for quite some time. In May 1992, the Lithuanian authorities 
introduced an interim currency that lacked even an official name. It was simply 
called the “coupon,” or talonas in Lithuanian. This coupon was issued at par 
with the Russian ruble. The authorities began to withdraw rubles from 
circulation in September, and forbid use of the ruble from the beginning of 
October. In June 1993, the authorities announced the introduction of the new 
currency, the litas. From August 1993, the talonas ceased to be legal tender and 
the use of foreign currencies was banned. The litas was convertible for current 
account purposes, but Lithuania retained restrictions on capital account 
transactions longer than its Baltic neighbors.
Lithuania also differed from the other Baltic countries at the beginning of 
economic reforms in its exchange rate arrangement. The country maintained a 
dual exchange rate system until autumn 1993. Due to Lithuania’s lax monetary 
stance, inflation was considerably higher than in Estonia or Latvia, and was 
reflected in the external value of the Lithuanian currency. The talonas 
depreciated markedly against the dollar up to summer 1993. Tightened monetary 
policy eventually stopped the depreciation, and the litas even appreciated





























































































slightly. Partly because of the observed volatility of the exchange rate and the 
low credibility of monetary policy, debate about the appropriate exchange rate 
regime intensified in autumn 1993. Ultimately, Lithuania decided to adopt a 
currency board in March 1994. The new arrangement became effective in April 
1994. The litas was pegged to the US dollar at rate of four to one (USD 1 = LTL 
4). So far the currency board arrangement has been kept in place at this rate, 
although the Bank of Lithuania intends to give up the currency board and adopt 
a monetary policy based on a more traditional central bank model.7 While the 
Bank of Lithuania has already introduced several monetary policy instruments, 
the country officially still has a currency board, and the monetary base is still 
100% backed by foreign currency reserves.
Of all the Baltics, Lithuania suffered the largest output collapse at the 
beginning of transition. Growth returned in 1995. At the end of 1995 and 
beginning of 1996, however, Lithuania experienced a banking crisis which was 
less severe than in Latvia and had little impact on the real economy. By 1997, 
real GDP growth had recovered to 7.3%. The exchange rate stability conferred 
by currency board helped bring inflation down. At the beginning of 1994, annual 
inflation was almost 200%. Presently, inflation is close to zero. Much like 
Estonia, however, the economy has grown along with a deteriorating external 
balance. In 1997, the current account deficit was approximately 10% of GDP; in 
1998, it exceeded 12% of GDP.
2.2 Development of Banking Systems
The number of banking institutions started to increase in all the Baltic countries 
even before the countries regained their political independence. The first 
commercial bank in the Soviet Union was founded in 1989 in Tartu, Estonia. 
When the Baltics regained their independence, the number of banks ballooned. 
By the end of 1993, there were 22 banks in Estonia, 61 in Latvia, and 32 in 
Lithuania. Many saw banks as a relatively easy means to earn money in the new 
economic environment. Banks in the Baltic countries were involved in financing 
foreign trade and speculating in the currency markets. The volatile economic 
environment following the break-up of Soviet Union presented ample 
opportunities in these activities. More traditional banking was not as lucrative, 
especially in the virtual absence of relevant laws and regulations.
When the aforementioned sources of revenue begun to dry up and the 
authorities in the Baltic countries stepped up their efforts in banking regulation, 
the number of banks began to diminish dramatically as the authorities




























































































introduced new minimum capital requirements.8 Due to these factors the number 
of banks began to decrease. (In Estonia, the number of banks had already started 
to decrease in 1993.) Most bank failures and closures had little consequence on 
ordinary households or companies despite the lack of an official deposit 
insurance scheme. The consolidation and privatization of banking sectors 
continued from 1994 onwards, although at varying speeds in different countries. 
During 1996 and 1997, Baltic banks expanded their businesses rapidly. Estonian 
banks, especially, grew very fast with some even moving into the Latvian 
market. After the general uncertainty over emerging markets rocked financial 
markets at the end of 1997, Baltic banks curbed their lending growth. 1998 
witnessed several takeovers of Baltic (mainly Estonian) banks by large foreign 
(mainly Swedish) banks.
Throughout the Baltics, banks were able to expand their business as 
inflation declined and economies stabilized. Estonian banks started by issuing 
short-term credits to private companies. During the past two years, bank lending 
to households has increased very rapidly as a mortgage market has developed 
and leasing operations have expanded. The average maturity of loans extended 
has also increased. At the end of 1998, approximately 85% of the loan stock had 
a maturity of more than one year. Stabilization was also associated with the 
emergence of a positive real interest rate. Real interest rates on short-term loans 
turned positive in early 1994.
Latvia’s macroeconomic stabilization was characterized by an increase in 
both the volume of bank lending and average maturities of loans. This positive 
development was, however, interrupted by the closure of the largest bank in 
Latvia in 1995. The closure meant severe contraction in the broader monetary 
aggregates. After this, the development of Latvian banking sector has been on a 
more secure footing. During 1997, bank lending to the private sector increased 
by 77%. At the end of 1993, 16% of all bank lending had maturity of more than 
one year. At the end of 1998, the corresponding figure was 67%.
The development of Lithuania’s banking sector has been somewhat 
slower than in the other two Baltic countries. This is reflected both in the 
volume of lending and maturities. The volume of loans grew 21% during 1997. 
At the end of 1993 only 12% of Lithuanian bank loans had maturities of over 
one year. By the end of 1998, this figure had risen to 46%, clearly lower than in 
Estonia or Latvia.
Old minimum capital requirements had been rendered economically meaningless by 




























































































3. The Effect of the Stage Three of EMU on Baltic Exchange Rate 
Arrangements
The start of the Stage Three of EMU and the launch of the euro profoundly 
affected the economic environment of the three Baltic countries. The euro area 
contains almost 300 million people producing a nominal gross product worth 
approximately USD 6.3 trillion in 1997. The euro’s arrival affects trade and 
financial flows, and introduction has a large impact on the monetary and 
exchange rate policies of the Baltic countries. This chapter outlines possible 
effects of the euro on Baltic economies, giving special emphasis to issues related 
to monetary and exchange rate arrangements. Naturally, the effect on, for 
example, exchange rate policy depends greatly on the direction of trade and 
financial flows, so these cannot be ignored.
3.1 The Direct Effect of the Euro on the Exchange Rate Policy
The change to the euro most directly affects Estonia, which previously pegged 
its currency to the D-Mark. As the D-Mark ceased to exist as an independent 
currency at the beginning of 1999, Estonia needs to change several laws. The 
law on the security for the Estonian kroon states that the external value of the 
kroon is expressed in terms of the D-Mark. For the sake of practicality, however, 
Estonian authorities take the view that the D-Mark will exist until the beginning 
of 2002 when euro notes begin to circulate and national currencies are 
withdrawn from circulation. This gives them until the end of 2001 to change the 
law on the security of the Estonian kroon. Technically, Estonia continues with 
the currency board pegged to the D-Mark, but preparations for changing the 
pertinent law should begin well in advance of December 2001 if the Estonian 
authorities want to maintain the peg. It takes a two-thirds majority to change 
such a law in the Estonian parliament. Estonia could change its peg to the euro 
relatively easily if it wants to continue operating a currency board. However, 
given the large external imbalance Estonia has had, and the current situation in 
the emerging markets, any change in the legislation concerning the kroon’s peg 
may invite speculation about changing the peg. Thus, the cautious approach of 
the Estonian authorities so far in regard to changing the relevant laws is quite 
prudent.
In Latvia, the composition of the SDR currency basket to which the lats is 
pegged has changed with the introduction of the euro. Currently, the euro makes 
up approximately 28% of the SDR. Thus, Latvia’s monetary integration into the 
euro area is not as tight as that of Estonia’s, provided Latvia continues to peg to 
the SDR. The Bank of Latvia also enjoys greater independence in deciding on an 




























































































simpler for Latvia to change its monetary regime. It remains to be seen, 
however, whether the Bank of Latvia wants to disrupt the continuity of its 
exchange rate policy. If the central bank wanted, it could keep the peg to the 
SDR and simply let the composition of the SDR change. The next revision of 
the composition of the SDR will be made at the end of 2000, and it is widely 
expected that at this time the euro will be given a larger share than the current 
28%. In effect, Latvia would become more integrated into the euro area in 
exchange rate policy even if the Latvian authorities do nothing to change their 
nominal exchange rate regime.
Lithuania has announced its decision to give up the currency board 
arrangement. According to Bank of Lithuania’s original program, the currency 
board was to have been abandoned during the first half of 1999. Now this 
change is planned to take place sometime in 2000. The Bank of Lithuania has 
already introduced some monetary policy instruments. At the same time, the 
Lithuanian authorities have announced that they will continue fixing the litas to 
a foreign currency. In 1997, the Bank of Lithuania said the litas would be 
pegged to a basket consisting of the US dollar and the euro (the text is not 
explicit on the composition of the basket). However, some Lithuanian 
authorities have recently said that a direct peg to the euro might be possible. 
Lithuania is the only Baltic country to state its intentions to change its exchange 
rate policy, although this change is not a direct consequence of the introduction 
of the euro. The Bank of Lithuania admits the need to become better integrated 
with the EU and prepare for the EMU, but it also gives other reasons such as 
improving its ability to react to banking crises and neutralize large capital 
inflows. In any case, Lithuania wants to become better integrated with the euro 
area in its exchange rate policy.
Lithuania’s declaration of its intentions to abandon its currency board has 
prompted some speculation about the sustainability of the peg, especially in light 
of the country’s relatively large current account deficit. The recent Russian crisis 
may also have increased uncertainty. Presently, the Lithuanian authorities are 
cautious, so 2000 seems the most probable date for repegging of the litas.
3.2 Trade Flows Between the Euro Area and the Baltic Countries
The eleven countries comprising the euro area comprise the single most 
important trading partner for all Baltic countries. This section looks at the trade 
between the Baltic countries and the euro area. Tables 3.1a-c depict the 
evolution of the geographical distribution of Baltic countries’ foreign trade from 
1994 to 1998. Note that the euro area’s importance as a trading partner has 
grown fairly steadily for Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia’s shift to Western 




























































































the euro area. Generally speaking, the Baltic countries were able to shift their 
trade quickly from the other former countries of the Soviet Union to Western 
European markets.9
There are naturally differences among the countries.10 In Estonia, the 
share of the euro area is significantly larger in imports than in exports. This is 
largely due to the predominance of Finland in exports and imports. For example, 
the 1998 share of Finland in total Estonian exports was 18.7%, whereas imports 
from Finland were 22.6% of total imports. For all Estonian foreign trade in 
1998, euro-area countries accounted for 39%. The increase in trade with Sweden 
essentially offset the decrease in Russian trade caused by the economic crisis in 
Russia.
In Latvia the relative importance of Russia and other CIS countries (most 
notably Ukraine) has been declining. Both Latvian producers and consumers 
have turned to the more stable markets of Western Europe. The recent economic 
problems in Russia (which spread to Ukraine and Belarus) have hastened this 
trend. Euro-area countries form the single largest trading partner (in pre-euro 
1998, the share of the euro-area countries in the Latvian foreign trade was 36%). 
Sweden and the UK are also very important to Latvia. Exports to UK have 
boomed during the last two years.
Lithuania is clearly the most dependent on CIS markets, although the 
importance of Russia has decreased. In 1997, the CIS was still as important an 
export market as the eleven countries of the euro area. By 1998, the relative 
importance of the euro area was much larger. The euro-area countries are also 
by far the largest exporters to Lithuania. Their combined share of trade was 32% 
in 1998.
9 For an assessment of the early years of Baltic foreign trade, see Korhonen (1996c).
10 In addition to the usual problems relating to the quality of data in transition economies used 
in assessing the trade flows, one should bear in mind that at least some Estonian exports to 
Finland, the remaining Baltic countries and Ukraine have actually been targeted to Russia. 





























































































Table 3.1a Geographical distribution of Estonian foreign trade
199 4 1995 1 9 9 6 1 997 199 8
E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts
E u r o  a re a 3 0 .8 % 4 9 .7 % 3 6 .6 % 5 2 .4 % 3 2 .2 % 5 0 .3 % 2 8 .3 % 4 4 .5 % 3 0 .2 % 4 5 .3 %
S w e d e n 1 0 .8 % 8 .9 % 1 0 .9 % 8 .5 % 1 1 .6 % 8 .2 % 1 3 .5 % 9 .1 % 16 .5% 9 .0 %
D e n m a rk 3 .4 % 2 .6 % 3 .3 % 2 .8 % 3 .5 % 2 .8 % 3 .2 % 2 .6 % 3 .6 % 2 .8 %
U K 2 .8 % 2 .1 % 3 .3 % 2 .2 % 3 .5 % 3 .3 % 3 .7 % 3 .1 % 4 .2 % 3 .0 %
R u s s ia 2 3 .1 % 1 6 .7 % 1 7 .7 % 1 6 .1 % 16 .6% 1 3 .6 % 1 8 .8 % 1 4 .4 % 1 3 .4 % 1 1 .1 %
L a tv ia 8 .2 % 1.5% 7 .5 % 2 .0 % 8 .3 % 1.9% 8 .6 % 1.8% 9 .5 % 2 .0 %
L ith u a n ia 5 .5 % 2 .6 % 4 .7 % 1.6% 5 .7 % 1 .6 % 6 .1 % 1.5% 4 .7 % 1.6%
T o ta l  v a lu e , 
U S D  b n
1.3 1.7 1.8 2 .5 2 .1 3 .2 2 .9 4 .4 3 .2 4 .8
Source: Statistical Office of Estonia and author’s own calculations
Table 3.1b Geographical distribution of Latvian foreign trade
199 4 1995 1 996 1 997 1998
E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts
E u r o  a re a 2 1 .0 % 2 9 .4 % 2 3 .6 % 3 6 .1 % 2 3 .3 % 3 4 .5 % 2 2 .3 % 3 8 .6 % 2 7 .6 % 4 1 .0 %
S w e d e n 6 .9 % 6 .4 % 9 .3 % 8 .0 % 6 .6 % 7 .9 % 8 .3 % 7 .7 % 10 .3% 7 .2 %
D e n m a rk 1 .6 % 2 .3 % 2 .0 % 1.4% 3 .7 % 2 .3 % 3 .9 % 3 .5 % 5 .1 % 3 .8 %
U K 9 .7 % 2 .4 % 9 .1 % 2 .7 % 11 .1% 2 .8 % 1 4 .3 % 3 .3 % 13 .5% 3 .1 %
R u ss ia 2 8 .1 % 2 3 .6 % 2 5 .3 % 1 8 .2 % 2 2 .8 % 1 4 .2 % 2 1 .0 % 1 5 .6 % 12 .1% 1 1 .8 %
E s to n ia 2 .6 % 3 .5 % 3 .1 % 5 .1 % 3 .7 % 5 .7 % 4 .2 % 6 .0 % 4 .5 % 6 .6 %
L ith u a n ia 5 .5 % 5 .9 % 5 .5 % 5 .5 % 7 .4 % 6 .3 % 7 .5 % 6 .4 % 7 .4 % 6 .3 %
T o ta l  
v a lu e , 
U S D  b n
1.0 1.2 1.3 1.8 1.4 2 .3 1.7 2 .7 1.9 3 .2
Source: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia and author’s own calculations
Table 3.1c Geographical distribution of Lithuanian foreign trade
1 9 9 4 1 995 199 6 199 7 1998
E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts E x p o r ts Im p o r ts
E u ro  a re a 2 2 .9 % 2 5 .8 % 2 8 .0 % 2 7 .7 % 2 5 .7 % 3 1 .5 % 2 4 .0 % 3 5 .4 % 2 6 .8 % 3 6 .0 %
S w e d e n 3 .1 % 2 .4 % 2 .5 % 2 .8 % 1.7% 3 .1 % 1 .9 % 3 .2 % 2 .5 % 3 .7 %
D e n m a rk 1.7% 2 .6 % 2 .7 % 3 .5 % 2 .6 % 3 .8 % 3 .4 % 4 .2 % 4 .0 % 3 .8 %
U K 2 .3 % 1.4% 3 .1 % 3 .1 % 2 .8 % 3 .9 % 3 .2 % 3 .3 % 3 .4 % 3 .7 %
R u s s ia 2 8 .2 % 3 9 .3 % 2 0 .4 % 3 1 .2 % 2 4 .0 % 2 5 .9 % 2 4 .5 % 2 4 .3 % 16 .7% 2 1 .1 %
U k ra in e 6 .1 % 3 .0 % 7 .5 % 2 .3 % 7 .7 % 2 .6 % 8 .8 % 2 .0 % 8 .0 % 1.9%
B e la ru s 6 .6 % 3 .8 % 1 0 .8 % 3 .6 % 10 .2% 2 .4 % 1 0 .3 % 2 .4 % 8 .8 % 2 .2 %
L a tv ia 8 .4 % 2 .7 % 7 .1 % 3 .1 % 9 .2 % 3 .3 % 8 .6 % 3 .4 % 1 1 .2 % 1.8%
E s to n ia 2 .5 % 1.6% 2 .2 % 1.8% 2 .5 % 2 .2 % 2 .5 % 2 .4 % 2 .7 % 1.5%
T o ta l  
v a lu e , 
U S D  b n
2 .0 2 .3 2 .7 3 .6 3 .4 4 .6 3 .9 5 .6 3.7 5 .8




























































































There are numerous arguments for and against fixed exchange rates, but the 
consensus, ceteris paribus, is that the advantages of fixing a currency become 
pronounced as the country’s dependence on foreign trade increases (see, for 
example, McCallum 1996).11 Baltic countries surely qualify as countries highly 
dependent on foreign trade. In 1997, the ratio of foreign trade (exports and 
imports) to GDP was 157% for Estonia, 81% for Latvia and 104% for Lithuania. 
Moreover, the geographical distribution of Baltic countries’ foreign trade would 
suggest that Baltic countries could benefit from some sort of exchange peg to 
the euro area. Despite the fact that Russia and several other CIS countries 
remain important trading partners for the Baltics, it is too much of a stretch to 
argue for a ruble peg. Indeed, including any currency as volatile as the ruble in a 
currency basket stands to degrade the credibility of a currency (although it might 
help to stabilize the nominal effective exchange rate).
The desirability of a fixed exchange rate naturally depends on a host of 
other factors (including possible political reasons). Nevertheless, it is a non­
trivial task to analyze, for example, the correlation of business cycles in the 
Baltics with those of the EU or the euro area. All transition countries have 
undergone profound structural adjustments, and thus the economic data covering 
recent years is probably of relatively little use in predicting future correlations 
with economic growth in other countries. For this reason, I consider intensity of 
trade as the most significant indicator of economic integration. I will return to 
these questions in Section 4.1.
The costs and benefits of fixing the currency to the Euro do not depend 
solely on the amount of trade the Baltic countries conduct with the euro area. 
Fixing to the euro is more desirable if other significant trading partners have 
also fixed their currencies to the euro. Thus, the decision of a single Baltic 
country about its foreign exchange rate regime depends to some extent on what 
the other two decide. For example, Lithuania has the lowest share of trade with 
the countries of the euro area. However, if Estonia and especially Latvia decide 
to peg their currencies to the euro (or at least to a basket where the euro plays a 
major role), the argument for a similar peg for Lithuania would be stronger. It 
should also be remembered that Denmark, which is a reasonably large trading 
partner for all Baltic countries, has decided to participate in ERM2, and thus peg 
to the euro. Table 3.2 shows how much the foreign trade of the Baltic countries 
might be with the entire euro bloc (i.e. the euro area plus countries that have 
pegged to the euro). The first two columns use the assumption that the euro bloc 
consists only of the euro area and the two countries which will be members of
11 On the other hand, openness to trade might very well be influenced by the foreign exchange 




























































































ERM2 from the beginning, Denmark and Greece.12 The next two columns 
assume that all Baltic countries peg to the euro. The last two columns assume 
Central and Eastern European countries (Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Czech and 
Slovak Republic) also peg to the euro. Poland is quite an important trading 
partner for Lithuania. (Table 3.2 is based on foreign trade data from 1998.)
We can see that the exchange rate regime chosen by one or two countries 
may have strong externalities on others. For Latvia and Lithuania, the exchange 
rate arrangements of the other two Baltic countries are quite important, as a 
large share of their foreign trade is conducted with the other Baltic economies. 
For Estonia, the additional incentive from Latvia and Lithuania choosing a euro 
peg would be quite small. It appears that the Baltic countries have fairly similar 
comparative advantage in their exports to the European Union (see Kaitila & 
Widgren 1999). If all Baltic countries fix their currencies, this would decrease 
the risk of gaining competitive advantage in EU markets through devaluations.







Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Estonia 33.8% 48.1% 48.0% 51.8% 48.3% 54.3%
Latvia 32.8% 45.0% 44.7% 57.9% 47.1% 63.9%
Lithuania 30.9% 40.0% 44.7% 45.8% 48.6% 55.3%
The costs and benefits of monetary integration with the euro area depend not 
only on trade flows, but also on the currencies used in foreign trade. While data 
on invoicing currencies is usually more scarce than data on trade flows, Baltic 
central banks publish estimates about the share of different invoicing currencies. 
In Estonia’s case, the US dollar’s share is approximately a third, which is not as 
much as in the other Baltic countries.13 The Estonian specialty (reflecting the 
large trade and investment ties between the countries) is the large share of 
Finnish markka in invoicing of foreign trade, approximately one fourth. The D- 
Mark is used in slightly less than a fifth of foreign trade transactions, and all 
other foreign currencies account for five per cent of invoicing or less. In Latvia, 
the share of the US dollar in foreign trade has remained around 50%. The D- 
Mark is used in about a fifth of foreign trade transactions, and no other currency 
significantly exceeds the 5% level. For Lithuania, the share of the US dollar has 
been approximately 60% of all foreign trade for several years. The second most 
important invoicing currency is the D-Mark, its share is around 20% of trade.
12 African countries with currencies pegged to the French franc are omitted as their share in 
Baltic foreign trade is miniscule.




























































































All other foreign currencies play very minor roles in the invoicing of foreign 
trade.
The future development of invoicing currencies in Baltic foreign trade 
will naturally depend on the acceptance of the euro as an international means of 
payment. If the euro takes a significant share in global trade from currencies 
joining EMU, and if CIS countries switch some of their foreign trade to the euro 
from the dollar, the Baltics can be expected to conduct a significant share of 
their foreign trade in euros. However, this might take years.
The introduction of the euro will lower barriers to trade among the 
countries participating in Stage Three of EMU. This might shift some of the 
trade now conducted with countries outside EMU to inside the new currency 
union. However, Temprano-Arroyo and Feldman (1998b) argue that, for CEECs 
generally, the effects from the resulting trade diversion would be small and 
counterbalanced by the positive effect EMU would have on growth within the 
euro area. De Grauwe & Skudelny (1997) estimate that eliminating exchange 
rate uncertainty inside EMU-11 (now the euro-11) could generate an extra 6% of 
trade inside the EMU-11 in the long run.
If the Baltics peg their currencies to the euro or a basket in which the euro 
is a major component, then movements in the value of the euro against other 
currencies will naturally affect foreign trade of Baltic countries. The larger the 
foreign trade with the euro area is, the smaller this effect. Further, the relative 
importance of EUR/USD and EUR/JPY cross-rates would not be considerable 
for the Baltic countries, because a relatively small share of their trade is with 
these countries or with countries that have pegged their currencies to the dollar 
or yen.
3.3 Capital flows between the euro area and the Baltics
The Baltics received substantial capital inflows after regaining their 
independence. Indeed, Estonia is among the highest receivers of per capita FDI 
among all transition economies in Europe. During the last two years Latvia and 
Lithuania have begun to catch up as their privatization processes have 
progressed. Estonia has also received large (relative to its size, of course) bank 
loans and portfolio investment during recent years, although the recent crises in 
emerging markets have affected these flows.
Countries joining the euro area have been a major source of these 
investments. Thus, the introduction of the euro may affect the capital flows and 




























































































Table 3.3 shows the geographical distribution of the stock of foreign 
direct investments in the Baltics. Note the substantial differences. In Estonia’s 
case, euro-area countries contributed approximately 35% of FDI, although here 
the contribution of Finland is 27% of all FDI. All in all the stock of FDI to 
Estonia is approximately USD 1.8 billion. This represents approximately one- 
third of nominal GDP. In 1997, the flow of FDI was 2.7% of GDP, but in 1998 
the value of investments jumped to almost 11% of GDP. This increase in FDI 
was largely associated with the acquisition of the two largest Estonian banks, so 
in all likelihood it does not represent a permanent shift in the level of FDI.
Euro-area countries have also contributed a large amount of FDI to 
Lithuania, almost one third of the whole stock. In Latvia’s case, the euro-area 
share has been reasonably small in providing FDI. Russia and Denmark have 
made up a significant portion of the entire investment stock. However, during 
the past two years investments from euro area countries have clearly increased, 
so that they currently constitute the largest single source of FDI to Latvia. At the 
end of 1998, the stock of FDI to Latvia was USD 1.1 billion (slightly more than 
15% of nominal GDP); for Lithuania, USD 1.6 billion (approximately 15% of 
GDP). In 1998, FDI flows corresponded to 4.3% of GDP in Latvia and 8.6% of 
GDP in Lithuania. In Lithuania’s case, the high FDI figure is mostly due to the 
privatization sale of Lithuanian Telecom.
Table 3.3 Geographical distribution of FDI stocks in the Baltics, end-1998
Estonia Latvia Lithuania
Euro area 35.4% 22.5% 31.0%
Sweden 32.4% 6.9% 16.9%
Denmark 4.7% 15.5% 6.6%
Russia 1.8% 8.7% 1.7%
United States 5.2% 10.7% 18.7%
Norway 4.8% 3.8% 4.2%
Estonia - 3.4% 4.3%
Sources: Bank of Estonia, Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, Lithuanian D epartm ent o f 
Statistics, and author’s own calculations
Estonia’s lead in FDI stock is mostly the result of Estonia’s earlier moves to 
privatization. Most Estonian privatizations are now completed,14 whereas Latvia 
and Lithuania still have a way to go. It is expected that FDI flows to Latvia and 
Lithuania will exceed those to Estonia during the next year or two. In the long 
run, of course, privatization will cease to affect FDI flows. At that point, 
structural characteristics of the countries and their economic policies will matter
14 A few infrastructure companies are remain to be privatized. Their privatization has proven 




























































































most. It also seems likely that the present geographical concentration of FDI 
stocks will abate in the future.
Other capital flows into the Baltics were minor before 1997. However, 
their absolute size and relative importance have grown. In 1997, Estonia 
received substantial inflows of capital both as portfolio investments and bank 
lending. In 1997, Estonia received portfolio investments worth USD 260 million 
(5.6% of GDP). In addition, Estonian banks borrowed USD 300 million from 
abroad (6.4% of GDP). In 1998, the net portfolio investments were practically 
zero, reflecting the difficult situation in emerging markets everywhere. Net 
borrowing by banks was less than USD 40 million, less than one percent of 
GDP.
In Latvia’s case, the net flow of portfolio investments was actually 
negative in 1997, i.e. Latvians made more portfolio investments abroad than 
were invested into Latvia. The net outflow of portfolio investments was USD 
600 million, or 10% of GDP. One would be tempted to conclude that Latvian 
banks have invested quite heavily in neighboring markets, namely to Russia. 
This conclusion is supported by the recent report by the Bank of Latvia that 
approximately 8% of Latvian bank assets were invested in Russia before the 
crisis in August 1998. The Russian government’s de facto default on state debt 
has meant considerable losses to many Latvian banks. Other net investments 
into Latvia (mainly borrowing by Latvian banks) were USD 350 million (6.1% 
of GDP) in 1997. In 1998, the net outflow of portfolio investments was clearly 
smaller, less than USD 10 million. Other investments also declined.
Lithuanian net portfolio investments were approximately USD 190 
million (2% of GDP) in 1997, and other investments USD 250 million (2.6% of 
GDP). In 1998 the net portfolio investments into Lithuania were USD -50 
million (-0.5% of GDP), but other investments USD 550 (5.1% of GDP).
Capital movements across the borders of the Baltic countries have been 
quite large relative to the size of the economies. Such large capital movements 
could be quite destabilizing in any exchange rate regime, but in a system of 
fixed exchange rates the authorities have to take care that large inflows do not 
lead to overtly inflated asset prices and encourage excessive domestic lending. A 
reversal of capital flows might then lead to economic contraction and endanger 




























































































The Baltic financial systems have progressively become more integrated into 
global financial markets. However, the equity and debt markets are still in a very 
early stage of development in all the Baltic countries (although in Estonia the 
equity market is somewhat more active than in Latvia or Lithuania).15 This 
section concentrates mainly on the integration of Baltic banking systems into the 
euro area and the possible effects of the euro on Baltic banking.
As noted in section 2.2, the Baltics witnessed a boom in the number of 
banks during the early years of transition. However, the number of banks soon 
started to decrease through closures and mergers. Currently,16 Estonia has six 
banks, Latvia 28, and Lithuania 12.17 At the same time foreign ownership in 
large Baltic banks has increased. In October 1998, the Swedish Swedbank 
announced that it had acquired 48% of Estonia’s largest financial institution, 
Hansapank. There is currently one Finnish bank operating in Estonia. Swedish 
SEB owns between a third and a half of the second largest bank in Estonia, the 
largest bank in Latvia and the second largest bank in Lithuania. Latvia has 
Estonian, French and German banks. French and Polish banks have set up shop 
in Lithuania. So at the level of ownership and operations Baltic banking systems 
are already somewhat integrated to EU and, in particular, to the euro area. 
However, from the viewpoint of exchange rate and monetary policy it is 
probably more important that a significant share of bank balance sheets are 
denominated in foreign currencies. Thus, unless bank liabilities and assets in 
foreign currencies are equal, changes in the exchange rate will add to volatility 
in the net value of banks.
Table 3.4 Share of foreign-currency-denominated assets and liabilities consolidated 
balance sheets of Baltic banking systems, end-1998





Sources: National central banks, * end-March 1999
15 In mid-1998, the market capitalization of Tallinn Stock Exchange was less than $600 
million, $360 million in Riga Stock Exchange and $1800 in the National Stock Exchange of 
Lithuania. Trading is by far most active in Tallinn Stock Exchange.
16 May 1999.
17 I have included the branches of foreign banks in all Baltic countries with the exception of 
the Lithuanian Development Bank and Turto Bankas, which was set up to sort out bad loans 




























































































At the end of 1998, the Estonian banking system had both significant assets and 
liabilities in foreign currencies, i.e. 50.0% of consolidated assets and 43.7% of 
liabilities were denominated in foreign currencies. In particular, the Estonian 
exchange rate regime has given banks strong incentives to conduct much of their 
business in D-Marks. The overwhelming majority of the foreign-currency- 
denominated assets and liabilities are denominated in D-Marks, which is to say 
euros. In addition to this, many loan contracts, which are denominated in kroons 
also include a clause tying the principal of the loan to the external value of the 
kroon. This means that banks have more assets denominated in foreign currency 
than the aforementioned figures would suggest.18 This, in turn, would mean that 
the difference between the banking sector’s foreign currency assets and its 
liabilities is more than ten percentage points of its consolidated balance sheet. 
Banks have more assets in foreign currencies than liabilities, meaning that if 
Estonian the kroon were to depreciate, Estonian banks would benefit (provided 
that their customers are able to service their loans, as was already mentioned).
In Latvia, the banks have an even larger share of their balance sheets in foreign 
currencies than in Estonia. On the liabilities side, simple demand deposits 
denominated in foreign currencies make up almost 45% of all foreign currency 
liabilities. It is noteworthy that foreign-currency-denominated assets make up 
65% of all bank assets. Foreign-currency-denominated debt instruments and 
especially claims on foreign banks make up the bulk of these foreign currency 
assets. In this sense, the Latvian banking system is very much integrated into the 
international financial system. The large share of foreign currency assets and 
liabilities on bank balance sheets implies that Latvian banks would be 
vulnerable to changes in the external value of the lats.
In Lithuania, the banking sector conducts more of its business in the 
domestic currency than in the other two Baltic countries. Foreign currency assets 
make up slightly less than 40% of all assets. Foreign-currency-denominated 
liabilities are less than one third of all liabilities. Lithuanian banks may have had 
more difficulties in attracting foreign financing because of Lithuania’s lower 
credit rating than that of the other two Baltic countries. Lithuanian banks have 
had less business with Russian companies and individuals than Latvian banks. 
This may partly explain the somewhat lower share of foreign-currency- 
denominated assets and liabilities.
18 Another matter is whether the clients who in effect have taken foreign currency loans 




























































































In November 1998, the European Union started membership negotiations with 
six countries. Five of these (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
Estonia) are former socialist countries that have been deemed to have 
sufficiently progressed in their economic and political transition to be able to 
join the EU after negotiations. Regardless of when the negotiations end and the 
new members join, most CEECs are eventually expected to be members of the 
EU. This will probably take many years. This study assumes that Latvia and 
Lithuania will be invited into membership negotiations at some future date and 
that sometime after that they will become EU members. (It is, of course, not 
certain that Estonia will be the first Baltic country to join the EU).
The aim of this chapter is to first examine what effects the preparation for 
membership in the European Union will have on the monetary and exchange 
rate policies in the Baltic countries. A second, related, question (and admittedly, 
more distant) is how the Baltic countries might best prepare for participation in 
the euro area once they have become EU members.
First, I will look at criteria on the desirability of a fixed exchange rate 
regime and how well the Baltic countries fulfill these. The choice of exchange 
rate regime largely determines monetary policy, but there are also some 
technical issues related to monetary policy that the Baltics must address before 
joining the EU. I will try to highlight at least some of these. The second section 
offers tentative speculations about the changes preparation for EMU 
participation will bring to the Baltics.
4 The Effects of EU Membership on Exchange Rate and Monetary Policies
4.1 Monetary and Exchange Rate Policies before EU Membership
As noted in section 3.1, introduction of the euro has already meant some 
changes for the exchange rate policies the Baltics. The anchor currency has 
effectively changed in Estonia, the composition of the currency basket to which 
the lats is pegged has also changed, and Lithuania will at least partly peg the 
litas to the euro. The Baltic currencies, therefore, are already extensively 
integrated with the euro area.
Even so, EU membership is probably years away for all Baltic countries. 
Therefore, Baltic monetary authorities need to decide on the type of exchange 
rate and monetary policy to pursue before membership. What would be the best 
policy for attaining sustainable long-term growth? How can monetary and 
exchange rate policies best help in pursuing EU membership? As mentioned in 




























































































choice of an exchange rate system. Countries, obviously, may peg their 
currencies to the euro for such political reasons as demonstrating the desire for 
quick integration with the EU.
4.1.1 Fixed or flexible exchange rates?
The analytical literature on the desirability of fixed exchange rates begins with 
Mundell (1961). As mentioned in section 3.2, most economists agree (see, e.g. 
Isard 1995 and references therein) that when countries are more open to foreign 
trade, they have more to gain from a regime of fixed exchange rates. It is usually 
argued that the more open an economy is, the faster changes in the exchange 
rate translate into changes in nominal wages and prices, thus rendering exchange 
rate policy less effective in maintaining external balance. At the same time, 
movements in the exchange rate threaten domestic price stability. One could 
therefore argue that smaller countries are natural candidates for fixed exchange 
rates as they are more likely to be more open to international trade. The currency 
of a very small country may also not be very effective in the traditional 
functions of money, i.e. as a unit of account and medium of exchange. For the 
currency of a tiny country, fixing to a more widely known currency could 
enhance its usefulness in the aforementioned functions.
If a country has a high level of factor mobility, then the costs of 
maintaining a fixed exchange rate (either in terms of inflation or unemployment) 
will be smaller than in a case of low-factor mobility.
If a group of countries generally faces dissimilar real shocks, then fixing 
their currencies will entail larger economic costs than letting the currencies float. 
A flexible exchange rate can shield a country from nominal shock originating 
from abroad, but a fixed regime can stabilize the effects of a domestic nominal 
shock. Given the brief period the Baltics have been independent and the 
immense structural change they have experienced, it is impossible to say even 
with the customary low degree of confidence how the shocks to Baltic countries 
will correlate with shocks to the EU and euro-area economies in the future. 
Further, separating nominal from real shocks is clearly impossible at this stage. 
Thus, we have to rely on cruder measures of integration. One could argue that as 
Baltic countries are highly integrated with the EU via trade links, their economic 
development will be closely integrated as well.
By fixing the external value of its currency, a country surrenders one tool 
with which to correct possible overappreciation. For example, if wage growth 
exceeds the growth in productivity for an extended period, domestic producers 




























































































inflexible downwards, then the fastest way to change real wages and restore 
international competitiveness is to devalue the currency.
Wages could rise exceptionally fast because of, for example, large capital 
inflows, which cause a boom in domestic lending, inflate the value of assets in 
the economy and create a large increase in domestic demand. When capital 
flows stop or perhaps even reverse, and if domestic prices and wages do not 
adjust downwards, the country might either adjust its exchange rate or face an 
economic downturn.
A rigid currency peg may also hamper a central bank’s ability to act as a 
lender of last resort if the banking system experiences widespread difficulties. 
Consider a situation where the central bank would otherwise extend credit to 
banks it deems solvent, but illiquid in the short-term. A rigid peg may prevent 
the central bank from intervening if it fears that the additional liquidity would 
endanger the currency peg. In such a situation, it is even likely that the currency 
is already under speculative attack, making the situation more difficult. This 
danger is even more pronounced in a currency board system. Under the strictest 
currency board rules, the monetary authority would be forbidden from issuing 
liquidity credits to the banking system. However, the two Baltic countries with 
currency boards have opted for a system whereby the central bank can credit the 
domestic banking system to the extent they have currency reserves over the 
required 100% backing. The Bank of Lithuania used this option during the 
1995-1996 banking crisis; the Bank of Estonia did so in 1994. This option would 
naturally not be available to the countries as long as they continue the currency 
board arrangements and if they faced large capital outflows draining their excess 
reserves. Here, the stability of the financial system would have to be ensured by 
the fiscal authorities. (We assume that such authorities would be concerned 
about stability and perhaps willing to protect depositors.) However, if a deposit 
insurance system is in place and it can cover the ensured deposits in full, then 
bank runs might not take place. Of course, this would not wholly negate the 
danger of systemic risk to the banking sector as a whole. It might even induce 
excessive risk-taking in banks because of the moral hazard deposit insurance 
systems are often thought to cause.
Stability of the banking system might actually be enhanced if a significant 
share of the domestic banking system consists of subsidiaries or branches of 
larger and well-capitalized foreign banks. Interestingly, Baltic countries seem to 
be moving in this direction with Estonia leading the way (the largest bank in 
Estonia is already half-owned by a Swedish bank and a Finnish bank is rapidly 
expanding its business in Estonia in retail banking). A large foreign presence in 
the banking sector might also be beneficial in the sense that it could promote a 




























































































observed that in many transition and developing economies, close connections 
between banks and the political system can lead to problems, especially if these 
connections hinder the work of banking supervisors. Close ties between the 
banks and the political system might also lead to sub-optimal lending decisions 
under political pressure, even if a full-blown banking crisis does not 
materialize.19
4.1.2 What Should the Baltics Do?
Baltic countries fulfill many of the conditions outlined above for the desirability 
of a fixed exchange rate. They are certainly small and very open to international 
trade. In 1998, the nominal value (at the average annual market exchange rate) 
of Estonia’s GDP was USD 5.2 billion, Latvia’s USD 6.4 billion, and 
Lithuania’s USD 10.7 billion. In total, the Baltic countries have slightly less 
than 8 million inhabitants and a combined GDP of slightly over USD 20 billion.
The Baltics’ openness to foreign trade is easy to quantify. In 1997, for 
example, the ratio of combined exports and imports of goods to GDP was almost 
160% in Estonia, over 80% in Latvia, and approximately 100% in Lithuania. To 
this one could add that international trade in services is also important. 
Transportation and, especially in Estonia, tourism have also become important 
sources of revenue. In 1998, trade in services (both exports and imports of 
services) amounted to almost 45% of GDP in Estonia, almost 30% in Latvia, 
and slightly less than 20% in Lithuania. Baltic countries have served as 
transportation links for trade between Russia and Western Europe. It remains to 
be seen how the economic crisis in Russia affects this trade, but preliminary 
reports indicate that exports of raw materials from Russia have increased 
significantly during the recent months (as one might expect after a sizable 
devaluation).
Baltic labor markets are relatively unregulated, which should provide 
some flexibility in dealing with various shocks that might hit the economy. In 
particular, one could expect flexibility in wage-setting, which is almost 
completely decentralized. In this sense, the Baltic countries may have the 
flexibility needed in a regime of fixed exchange rates.
However, it is not known how much labor mobility exists inside the 
countries or between sectors. It is also largely unknown how fast education 
systems can respond in teaching new skills to people in outmoded occupations. 
Here, it may be advisable to be pessimistic about the mobility of labor inside 
countries. For example, Kuddo (1998) argues that a large portion of labor force






























































































in the Baltic countries (as well as in other transition economiesJTis ^functionally O 
illiterate,” i.e. lacking the skills needed in a market economy. present, therefis t- 
very little training and retraining for people in the labor forSp. f  urthemwe, ^  
Kuddo argues that vocational training does not offer skills that would o e i ^ 5 
demand in the labor market. This quite pessimistic view of the pre^j^ritjujition 
in the Baltic labor markets is reinforced by Hazley and Hirvensalo (1998). They 
conducted a survey among Finnish companies that had made investments in the 
Baltic countries and/or Russia. Most companies listed lack of qualified labor as 
a hindrance to their business. Thus, the flexibility of Baltic labor markets may 
be illusory. If the example of present EU countries is anything to go by, labor 
mobility to other countries would clearly be lower still, even at the future time 
when the Baltic countries join the EU. From the viewpoint of exchange rate 
policy, it could be advisable to increase various retraining programs and 
redesign at least parts of the education system to enable people to change 
occupations more easily, that is, create more factor mobility. On the other hand, 
flexibility in wage-setting may offset other rigidities in the labor market to a 
large degree.
Chart 4.1 Monthly gross wages (USD) 1/95-12/98
Many commentators have argued that the large external imbalances are evidence 
of an already overvalued exchange rate. The Baltics face exchange rate 
realignments in the near future."0 However, trade and current account deficits 
alone do not dictate whether a currency is overvalued. Countries starting from a 20
20 The inertia of monetary regimes is hard to foresee. For example, Lainela and Sutela (1994) 



























































































low level of economic development will probably offer investment opportunities 
with reasonably high expected returns. These investment opportunities would 
entice a capital inflow to the country and, if domestic investments exceed 
domestic savings, then the country will have a current account deficit as a matter 
of definition. It is hard to dispute that all post-socialist countries offered a great 
number of investment projects with a high expected return, although the 
associated risks, both economic and political, were also large. As risks have 
decreased, the investment flow into the transition economies has increased. 
Much of the foreign direct investment has been associated with privatization of 
former state-owned companies.
High and persistent current account deficits naturally give some cause for 
concern. If the current account deficit is mainly financed with capital inflows 
that can easily be reversed, then a country and especially its financial system 
may face difficulties if the capital flows decrease or reverse. Presently, it seems 
that Estonia’s current account deficit is clearly declining but, for Latvia, the 
Russian crisis has meant a significant widening of the deficit.
Table 4.1a Changes in productivity in manufacturing
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Estonia 6.7% 0.4% 3.7% 26.3% 2.3%
Latvia 9.5% -1.0% 8.6% 28.0% 1.9%
Lithuania -12.1% 12.0% 8.5% 7.6% 11.0%
Source: EBRD (1999)
Table 4.1b Changes in D-Mark unit labor costs
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Estonia 61.7% 35.2% 19.2% -5.3% 13.6%
Latvia 73.0% 17.9% 5.2% 4.2% 3.3%
Lithuania 85.1% 23.3% 30.5% 32.9% 7.5%
Source: EBRD (1999)
Another oft-cited piece of evidence for the eroding competitiveness of Baltic 
economies is the fast increase in dollar wages. Chart 4.1 shows the evolution of 
monthly US dollar wages in the three Baltic countries. The upward trend is 
apparent. However, mere wage costs do not tell us anything about 
competitiveness of the companies. One must also take into account changes in 
labor productivity. Table 4.1a shows the changes in productivity in 
manufacturing. (Since it is the manufacturing industry which is most exposed to 
foreign competition, it is appropriate to focus on its productivity.) One can see 
that productivity has increased during the latter half of this decade in all Baltic 




























































































increased almost 45% in Estonia, 53% in Latvia, and 27% in Lithuania. 
However, these changes in productivity exhibit considerable volatility, so one 
should consider this evidence with caution.
Table 4.1b shows the change in the annual unit labor costs in the 
manufacturing industries of the three Baltic countries. The general trend in 
Estonia and Latvia seems to be towards lower increases in the unit labor costs, 
although in Estonia their growth accelerated somewhat in 1998. In Lithuania, 
increases in unit labor costs were quite large up until 1997. It is hard to explain 
this large difference between the development in Lithuania and the other two 
Baltic countries. One might claim that the restructuring of manufacturing has 
progressed more slowly in Lithuania than in the other countries. Lithuania has 
received less FDI, and foreign owners are generally thought to be better at 
restructuring. Aghion and Carlin (1997) claim that “Foreign-owned privatized 
enterprises typically displayed a deeper form of restructuring.
This phenomenon seems to be common to practically all transition 
economies in Europe. It is of course impossible for all the companies to become 
foreign-owned, so one must not neglect the incentives for domestic-owned 
companies to restructure.
Halpem and Wyplosz (1998) try to determine equilibrium exchange rates 
in transition economies. They use the monthly dollar wage as a proxy for the 
real exchange rate. In general terms, dollar wages have risen in almost all 
European transition countries during the economic transition. However, the 
estimated equilibrium dollar wages do not always trend upwards.21 For the 
Baltic countries there is an upward trend in the equilibrium dollar wages that is 
consistent with the evidence presented on the evolution of productivity in the 
Baltic countries. In Estonia and Lithuania, wages had not reached their 
equilibrium levels by 1997, but in Latvia this happened during 1997, and thus 
wages may now be too high according to this model.
Given their small and very open economies, Baltic countries are natural 
candidates for fixed exchange rate regimes. From the beginning of 1999, the 
Baltics have conducted a significant portion of their foreign trade with countries 
in the euro area. This alone would argue for some sort of exchange rate peg to 
the euro. The exact form of this peg need not necessarily be the same as in the 
past, i.e. countries could choose somewhat looser pegs, if more flexibility in this
21 The determinants of equilibrium dollar wages were obtained from panel data consisting of 
85 countries and spanning the period 1970-95. In the final specification the determinants of 
monthly dollar wages were GDP per capita, age dependency ratio, government consumption 
(percent of GDP), openness of the economy, net foreign asset position and credit to private 




























































































area is deemed necessary. On the other hand, currency boards have an advantage 
over less strict regimes of fixed exchange rates. Full backing of the monetary 
base can give additional credibility to the peg and thus prevent speculative 
attacks against the currency.
Continuing with fixed exchange rates has its risks. If country loses 
external competitiveness, then rectifying this without exchange rate adjustment 
can be costly, especially if prices and wages are sticky downwards. Especially in 
Lithuania, where the development of productivity has lagged behind Estonia and 
Latvia, this risk is quite real. Naturally, the authorities in Estonia and Latvia also 
need to monitor their economies closely, especially given their large external 
imbalances.
Despite these caveats, the benefits of fixed exchange rates seem to outweigh 
the apparent risks in the case of the Baltics. It also appears that all Baltic 
countries are continuing with fixed exchange rates.
4.2 Monetary and exchange rate policies after EU accession, but before 
joining the euro area
It is likely to take several years before all of the Baltic countries become EU 
members. Internal wrangling over money within the EU and comprehension of 
accession criteria have dampened predictions of speedy accession. However, 
even before the Baltic countries (and the other CEECs) join the EU, they need to 
consider the changes membership will bring to their monetary and exchange 
rate policies.
4.2.1 When to join the monetary union?
When new members join the European Union, they take upon themselves the 
commitment to fulfill the stipulations of the Maastricht Treaty. That this 
condition applies to the new member states is clearly stated in the conclusions of 
the Copenhagen Council meeting in June 1993. Among other things, 
membership requires “the ability to take on the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” 
Further -  and this cannot be overstated -  the Maastricht criteria for joining 
Economic and Monetary Union are not criteria for membership in the European 
Union (see Dixon 1998). Applicant countries must thus concentrate on structural 
changes in their economies for many years to come, and not on strict 
interpretations of the Maastricht criteria. At the same time, it should be 
remembered that aiming for low and stable inflation in the medium-term is 




























































































decades has shown (see, e.g. Barro 1995) that high inflation hinders economic 
growth.22
Although the Maastricht criteria are not membership criteria, it is of 
interest to see where the applicant countries stand in this regard. This sort of 
exercise might give at least some indication how far the countries still have to go 
in their nominal convergence before participation in EMU can be considered. 
Recent experience from Italy and Belgium illustrates how difficult it can be to 
lower the general government debt once it has been allowed to rise to over 100% 
of GDP.
Table 4.2 shows how the applicant CEECs fared in 1997 with regard to 
the Maastricht criteria. The interest rate criterion is omitted as there simply is no 
truly functioning market for domestic long-term debt instruments in any of the 
applicant countries. This will obviously change in most applicant countries 
during the coming years as their financial markets mature and develop.
Clearly, no applicant country fulfills the criteria completely, even if we do 
not take into account the interest rate criterion. However, there are clear 
differences between the countries. For Baltic countries, the fiscal criteria in 
particular should provide few problems in the coming years. When Soviet Union 
disintegrated, Russia took over its foreign assets and liabilities, and thus for 
example the Baltic countries started with no external debt. Latvia and Lithuania 
incurred quite large deficits during the first half of this decade (Lithuania for 
longer than Latvia), but their public debt is still quite modest. If the experience 
of recent years is anything to go by, then Baltic countries will not embark on the 
road of large budget deficits. Concerning inflation, Latvia and Lithuania have 
managed to push inflation lower than any other CEEC applicant country.
If one believes that the past inflation performance is useful in predicting 
future inflation (insofar as it reflects authorities’ preference for and/or 
commitment to low inflation), then low inflation could also mean low long-term 
interest rates. Naturally, the rates will not be as low as in the current euro-area 
countries, because the applicant countries’ debt instruments will carry a 
significant risk premium for many years to come.
22 Although it has been difficult to find any significant difference between the growth 




























































































Table 4.2 Maastricht criteria for ten CEEC applicant countries in 1997
Inflation, % General 
government 




debt, %  of 
GDP




Estonia 11.3 2.1 5.6
Hungary 18.0 -5.7 68
Latvia 8.4 1.3 10.8
Lithuania 8.8 -1.9 22.2
Poland 15.1 -3.6 48.2




Slovenia 9.1 -1.8 24.1
Criteria -3% 60%
Source: Temprano-Arroyo & Feldman (1998a)
The changes that preparation for EMU participation will mean for the conduct of 
monetary policy in the new members will be quite large. First, when the new 
members join European Union, the Maastricht Treaty stipulates that the 
economic and exchange rate policies of member countries are a matter of 
common concern. In a sense, discussions concerning economic policies have 
already started with Commission’s Joint Assessments of medium term economic 
policy concerns (Dixon 1998). The intensity of dialogue will naturally increase 
as accession talks progress.
When the countries have joined European Union, they must then decide 
on ERM2 participation. Since no new member country is expected to opt out 
from joining the euro area, it is probable that they will join the ERM2. At the 
moment the consensus seems to be that the criterion on two year’s exchange rate 
stability means membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. Of course, a 
country could in principle stay in ERM2 longer than two years.
When is a country ready to join the Exchange Rate Mechanism? 
Presumably when it is ready to peg its currency to the euro and eventually join 
the monetary union. When the present member countries of the monetary union 
were chosen, the emphasis was very much on nominal convergence between the 
countries. This is reflected in the criteria on inflation, long-term interest rates, 
and exchange rate stability. These same criteria naturally apply to the present 
applicant countries when they want to join the monetary union, but for them the 




























































































countries, including the Baltics, should not join until their structural adjustment 
is more or less complete. Of course, it could be argued that if a country has been 
accepted into the EU, its structural adjustment to a functioning market economy 
is, by definition, complete. Otherwise, the country would be unable to compete 
inside the single market. If one accepts this argument, then the criteria for 
choosing new members for the monetary union is identical for the present 
members of the monetary union, i.e. the one based on the nominal convergence 
between the countries and the stability of their fiscal position.
CEECs have considerably lower GDP per capita than the countries 
currently in the monetary union. This disparity will persist for years to come, 
even if the current high growth continues in the more developed accession 
countries. However, there is a wide disparity of per capita GDP and income 
inside the current euro zone. In 1996, for example, per capita GDP (based on 
purchasing power parities) was USD 21,200 in Germany and USD 13,100 in 
Portugal. In other words, income disparities as such need not prevent CEECs 
from joining monetary union. There could be persistent inflation differentials 
inside the monetary union, as productivity would probably grow faster in the 
countries with lower levels of income. For evidence on the scope for inflation 
differentials in the current monetary union, see Alberola and Tyrvainen (1998). 
The process of catching up should naturally be advanced so far that the possible 
inflation differential is small enough to fall inside the Maastricht criterion on 
inflation. In a system of truly fixed exchange rates, the appreciation of the real 
exchange rate accompanying relative improvements in productivity must come 
in the form of higher inflation.23
Therefore one can argue that the new member countries of the European 
Union could join the monetary union (and before that ERM2) when their 
productivity levels have risen sufficiently. A sufficient level would be one where 
changes in productivity no longer threaten the attainment of the inflation 
criterion in a regime of fixed exchange rates (ERM2). Countries could naturally 
participate in ERM2 for several years and use readjustments of their central 
parities to attain the needed appreciation of their real exchange rate. Here, the
23 This argument relies on the Balassa-Samuelson model of real exchange rates, whereby 
traded and non-traded goods sectors have different productivity. The relative price of traded 
goods is proportional to the ratio of average labor products in the two sectors. Furthermore, it 
is assumed that the price of traded goods is the same in different countries, i.e. purchasing 
power parity holds in the traded goods sector. If the ratio of traded goods productivity to the 
productivity in the non-traded goods sector grows faster, for example, in Estonia than in the 
EU, then the relative price of non-traded goods will also rise faster in Estonia than in the EU. 
Because the price of traded goods is similar in Estonia and the EU, the Estonian currency will 





























































































authorities must weigh the costs these readjustments might bring in form of lost 
credibility.
Given the aforementioned arguments, one must conclude that the lower the 
current income level of an accession country, the longer it should wait for 
membership of the monetary union and perhaps ERM. This is especially 
important for the Baltic countries, because their income levels are lower than in 
most other applicant countries. In 1996 the per capita GDP (at purchasing power 
corrected exchange rates) was USD 4431 in Estonia, USD 3484 in Latvia and 
USD 4273 in Lithuania (OECD 1997).
4.2.2 Practical preparations for a membership in the monetary union
When Baltic countries prepare for membership in the euro area and the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism, they must gradually bring their monetary policy 
instruments in line with those used in the European System of Central Banks. As 
the final goal of the Baltic countries is to join euro area, it probably is a good 
idea to introduce similar monetary policy instruments as the ESCB uses in its 
operations well in advance of the actual membership so that both the central and 
commercial banks are adequately prepared for operations in the new 
environment. This point applies especially to Estonia, if it has the currency 
board arrangement still in place when it joins the European Union. The main 
instrument of monetary policy in the ESCB is the weekly reverse transaction 
(repo) tender (European Central Bank 1998, Table 1). This tender has a maturity 
of two weeks. The ESCB also provides longer term liquidity to the banks with 
monthly repo auctions, which have a maturity of three months. In addition to 
this the ESCB can engage in outright purchases and sales of debt instruments, 
and it can intervene in the foreign exchange market with swaps. The ESCB 
offers banks access to standing facilities, the marginal lending facility and the 
deposit facility. This is then the set-up of monetary policy instruments into 
which the Baltic countries should move at some point.
At the moment, the fairly strict currency board arrangement effectively limits 
the range of monetary policy instruments available to the Bank of Estonia. The 
Bank of Estonia has conducted monthly auctions of its own paper, but this has 
not been meant as a tool to manage liquidity. Rather it has been a way to offer 
Estonian banks a homogenous asset which could be used as collateral in 
interbank trading. The Bank of Estonia naturally intervenes in the foreign 
exchange market as it is obliged to sell foreign currency when presented with 




























































































In Latvia the main tool of monetary policy has been foreign exchange market 
intervention (Bank of Latvia 1998). The Bank of Latvia can make outright sales 
and purchases of treasury bills in the market. It can also arrange tenders both to 
provide (repos) and drain liquidity (reverse repos). The central bank has a 
standing Lombard credit facility.
In Lithuania the central bank uses infrequent repo auctions (with a 
maturity of one week) for provision of liquidity to the banking system, and 
deposit auctions (with variable maturity) to drain liquidity. Naturally the Bank 
of Lithuania also intervenes in the foreign exchange market to support the peg of 
the litas.
It appears that up until now the Bank of Latvia has introduced the widest 
variety of monetary policy instruments. This is natural, because it has not been 
constrained in this sense by a currency board as have Estonia and Lithuania. One 
could expect Lithuania to expand its arsenal of monetary policy instruments in 
the future, as it moves away from the currency board. The Baltic central banks 
naturally have many years to introduce more instruments and observe how they 
affect the banking sector, before they even join the European Union.
One interesting question in this regard is the fate of the Estonian currency 
board. Would a currency board be compatible with membership in the ERM2? 
The rate at which the Estonian kroon is pegged to the euro would become the 
new central parity, and in practice there would be no need for a band around the 
central parity. The Bank of Estonia would be able to maintain peg in the same 
way as before membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism. But, in a sense, 
membership in the ERM2 would be completely superfluous: the currency board 
ensures the stability of the exchange rate, not membership in the ERM2. Would 
this actual stability fulfill the Maastricht criterion on exchange rate stability? 
This would most probably be a political decision, although from an economic 
viewpoint actual stability should matter. Another issue is whether Estonia 
should exit the currency board to be able to introduce those monetary policy 
instruments, which are in use in ESCB. The exit from the currency board could 
then coincide with membership in the ERM2. This would give the central and 
commercial banks time to adjust to new procedures before membership in the 
monetary union.
The Maastricht criteria also include provisions for the independence of the 
central bank and they prohibit the central bank financing of government deficits. 




























































































grant a high degree of independence to the central banks, and the financing of 
budget deficits is prohibited.24
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
The start of Stage Three of the Economic and Monetary Union has changed the 
economic environment of the Baltic countries to a considerable degree. Further, 
the prospect of membership in the European Union promises even more 
changes. In this paper, I have looked at the implications these developments on 
monetary and exchange rate policies in the Baltics.
The introduction of the euro means that Baltic countries conduct a very 
significant part of their foreign trade with the countries who have a common 
currency. If these countries are counted as a single entity, then the euro area is 
the single most important trading partner for all the Baltic countries. This could 
also mean reorientation of the exchange rate policy, especially for Lithuania, 
which currently pegs the litas to the dollar. Introduction of the euro could also 
mean that the importance of the dollar as an invoicing currency diminishes.
The Baltic countries are also integrated to the euro area in other ways. 
Direct foreign investment in the Baltic countries has mainly come from the 
European Union. The financial systems of the Baltic countries, especially 
Estonia, have become very integrated into the global financial system, but 
naturally they have their closest links with the neighboring countries.
Currently Estonia has pegged its currency to the euro (via the German 
mark), Latvia to the IMF’s Special Drawing Right (SDR), and Lithuania to the 
dollar. Lithuania had previously announced that sometime during 1999 the litas 
will be pegged to a basket where the euro plays a significant role, but now it 
seems that repegging of the litas will take place in 2000. The currencies joining 
the euro area make up roughly one third of the SDR, so the lats is also partly 
pegged to the euro.
The introduction of the euro does not need to change the exchange rate 
regimes in the Baltic countries. But when the countries are in the process of 
joining the European Union, it is of interest to contemplate the choice of the 
appropriate exchange rate regime (which then determines the conduct of 
monetary policy). The Baltic countries are extremely small and open to 
international trade. This means that they are natural candidates for a regime of 
fixed exchange rates. When one also considers the fact that the present exchange 
rate arrangements have been quite successful in reducing inflation and




























































































maintaining macroeconomic stability, and as a result of this have gained popular 
support and credibility, the case for maintaining fixed exchange rates is quite 
strong. However, this approach is not without its dangers. In a regime of fixed 
exchange rates the fiscal authorities need to react with sufficient speed to 
threatening imbalances, which is difficult even under the most benign 
conditions. Maintenance of a fixed exchange rate also places heavy demands on 
the flexibility of the markets, especially the labor market. At the moment it 
appears that the Baltic countries may have sufficient flexibility in their labor 
markets when it comes to wage setting. In this context it should be remembered 
that the Maastricht criteria on joining the currency union are not criteria for 
joining the European Union.
The form of the currency peg is also a matter of some importance. When 
the capital movements have been completely liberalized (as they have been in 
the Baltic countries), maintaining the currency peg is very difficult if the 
underlying economic policies are not strictly in line with the peg. Perhaps the 
only solution for this dilemma is a currency board, which seems to have 
performed reasonably well in different countries also during the recent volatility 
in the global financial markets (with the possible exception of Hong Kong). For 
Estonia this would mean continuing with the present arrangement as long as 
possible. From this viewpoint it is slightly worrying that Lithuania is in the 
process of exiting from the currency board, although it should be remembered 
that so far Latvia has succeeded in maintaining its currency peg without a 
currency board. To achieve this the central bank and other authorities must be 
committed to the currency peg and be ready to implement policies which can be 
unpopular at least in the short-run. It remains to be seen how Lithuania fares in 
this respect.
Once the Baltic countries are members of the European Union, they must decide 
when to join the monetary union. As a first step towards this, they must join the 
Exchange Rate Mechanism 2. In the paper it is argued that the countries should 
have developed enough economically so that the inevitable25 appreciation of the 
real exchange rate does not threaten the attainment of the criterion on inflation. 
This would mean that membership of the monetary union is still quite far off, 
especially for the Baltic countries, which have quite low per capita GDP. One 
could naturally join ERM2 and then use readjustment of the central parity to 
achieve the needed appreciation of the real exchange rate, but this could damage 
the credibility of the exchange rate policy and could actually be 
counterproductive.
25 Inevitable in the sense that all accession countries are expected to grow faster than the 
current EU members, because they start from a lower level. Of course, bad economic policies 
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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998*
GDP change, % -14.2 -8.5 -1.8 4.3 3.9 10.6 4.0
Average inflation, % 1076 89.8 48.0 29.0 23.0 11.0 6.5
Current account 
balance, %  of GDP
n.a. 1.3 -7.1 -4.7 -9.2 -12.0 -8.6
General government 
balance, % of GDP
-0.8 -0.7 1.3 -1.2 -1.5 2.3 -0.3*
Nominal GDP, bn USD 1.04 1.64 2.28 3.54 4.37 4.63 5.19
Sources: EBRD (1999) and national statistical authorities, * EBRD estimate (1999)
Latvia
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP change, % -34.9 -14.9 0.6 -0.8 3.3 8.6 3.6
Average inflation, % 951.2 108.0 35.9 25.0 17.6 8.4 4.7
Current account 
balance, %  of GDP
1.7 6.9 -2.4 -3.6 -7.0 -6.4 -11.5
General government 
balance, %  of GDP
-0.8 0.6 -4.1 -3.5 -1.4 1.3 0.1*
Nominal GDP, bn USD 1.5 1.69 3.65 4.43 5.13 5.64 6.40
Sources: EBRD (1999) and national statistical authorities, * EBRD estimate (1999)
Lithuania
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
GDP change, % -37.7 -17.1 -11.3 2.3 4.7 7.3 5.1
Average inflation, % 1020.5 410.4 72.1 39.5 24.7 8.9 5.1
Current account deficit, 
%  of GDP
10.6 -3.3 -2.2 -10.3 -9.3 -10.3 -12.1
General government 
balance, %  of GDP
0.5 -4.3 -5.4 -4.5 -4.0 -2.4 -6.0*
Nominal GDP, bn USD 1.91 2.66 4.71 5.94 7.89 9.59 10.69
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